The key escrow problem and high computational cost are the two major problems that hinder the wider adoption of hierarchical identity-based signature (HIBS) scheme. HIBS schemes with either escrow-free (EF) or online/offline (OO) model have been proved secure in our previous work. However, there is no much EF or OO scheme that has been evaluated experimentally. In this letter, several EF/OO HIBS schemes are considered. We study the algorithmic complexity of the schemes both theoretically and experimentally. Scheme performance and practicability of EF and OO models are discussed. key words: identity-based signature, computational complexity, paring based cryptography
Introduction
The identity based signature (IBS) scheme is a digital signature scheme which allows a receiver to verify a message using the signer's identity as public key [1] . Utilizing private key generator (PKG) to generate private key for users, Choon et al. proposed the first practical IBS scheme [2] . Gentry et al. then presented the first hierarchical IBS (HIBS) scheme, which imposed domain PKGs to reduce the root PKG workload and solved the single-point failure problem [3] .
Since the user private keys are generated by PKGs, a PKG that knows the key can sign messages illegally without being detected. This problem is referred to as key escrow problem. Chen et al. proposed an escrow-free model that can extend any primitive HIBS scheme to solve the key escrow problem [4] . They applied the model to the SHER-IBS scheme [5] , and obtained the CWS-EF-HIBS scheme [4] .
Besides the key escrow problem, the low computation efficiency of HIBS scheme is another concern when deploying the identity-based signature scheme. Online/offline (OO) signature mechanism that divides the process of message signing into offline phase and online phase is an effective method to reduce the computational cost of signature generation. Imposing the OO mechanism, numerous identity-based online/offline signature (IBOOS) scheme have been proposed [6] , [7] . By extending the SHER-IBS scheme, Chen et BOOS) scheme with high online signing efficiency [6] . On this basis, Chen et al. proposed a user-selected secret model and applied to the HIBOOS scheme to achieve the EF-HIBOOS scheme, which were declared efficient enough to be practically deployed [7] . However, the authors had not implemented and experimental evaluated the schemes. In this letter, we consider several HIBS schemes, which have formally been proved secure and have not yet been implemented. The selected schemes include a primitive HIBS scheme proposed by Chow et al. [5] , and an escrowfree extension, an online/offline extension, a comprehensive scheme proposed by Chen et al. [4] , [6] , [7] . We implement the schemes, and evaluate the scheme performance both theoretically and experimentally. We analyze the evaluation results to study the signing/verification delays and transmission overhead of the schemes, as well as the performance influence of the EF and OO solutions.
Scheme Review
In this section, we review four proved secure HIBS schemes. The schemes are primitive scheme SHER-IBS, escrowfree scheme CWS-EF-HIBS, online/offline scheme CWS-HIBOOS, and comprehensive scheme CWS-EF-HIBOOS.
SHER-IBS
Setup. The root PKG works as follows:
1. generates multiplicative groups G 1 , G 2 of same prime order, and a bilinear pairingê : Verification. To verify a signature σ = {x, y 1 , . . . , y k , z} on message m with respect to identity ID = {I 1 , . . . , I k }, the receiver works as follows:
If so, outputs 1; otherwise, outputs 0.
CWS-EF-HIBS
1. generates groups G 1 , G 2 and bilinear pairingê : 
Verification. The receiver verifies the signature as follows:
j=1ê (y j , h j ) holds. If so, outputs 1; or else, outputs 0. Blame. Given {ID, m, σ}, where σ = {x, y 1 , . . . , y k , z, g ID }, this algorithm requires the user parameter g ID with respect to the identity ID from the AP. It outputs 1 if and only if g ID g ID and 0 otherwise.
CWS-HIBOOS
Setup. The same as the Setup algorithm in SHER-IBS. 2. for j = 1, . . . , k, computes
Online Signing. The signer computes the followings:
The signature is σ = {x, y 1 , . . . , y k , z, E}. Verification. The receiver verifies the signature as follows:
. If so, outputs 1; otherwise, outputs 0.
CWS-EF-HIBOOS
Setup. The same as the Setup algorithm in CWS-EF-HIBS. KeyGen. The same as the KeyGen algorithm in SHER-IBS. Publish. User publishes a public parameter and gets PKG signing factor from the root PKG as follows:
1. randomly picks s ID ∈ Z * p as user secret; 2. computes g ID = g s ID ; 3. publishes g ID by submitting it to the AP; 4. sends g ID to the root PKG, the root PKG computes and returns
Offline Signing. The signer runs the offline signing algorithm as follows:
1. picks a random s ∈ Z * p and computes x = g s 2 ; 2. for j = 1, . . . , k, computes
The signature is σ = {x, y 1 , . . . , y k , z, E, g ID }. Verification. The receiver verifies the signature as follows:
1. computes h = H 1 (m, x) and f = H 2 (g ID , ID); 2. checks whether the equation holds: 
If so, outputs 1. Otherwise, outputs 0.
Blame. The same as the Blame in CWS-EF-HIBS.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the above described schemes in terms of signing/verification computational cost and transmission overhead both theoretically and experimentally.
Theoretically Comparison
We make comparison of computational cost and transmission overhead between the HIBS schemes theoretically. Let k denote the length of identity, T e the time to perform a group exponentiation computation and T p the time of a pairing computation. Since the overhead of hash computation and group point multiplicative computation are negligible comparing with T e and T p , we only consider these operations and neglect all the other operations. Table 1 shows the theoretical performance comparison. From the signing equation in Sect. 2.1, we can observe that the time to sign a signature in the SHER-IBS is (k + 2)T e , which grows linearly as the identity length k. Nevertheless, with the online/offline model, the CWS-HIBOOS scheme can obtain a constant-time online signing algorithm. Although the scheme introduces a high computational cost offline signing algorithm, it has little influence in a real-time scenario since the algorithm is implemented offline. Analyzing the signing/verification equation in Sect. 2.2, we observe that the escrow-free model only brings in a group exponentiation computation and a paring computation to the signing and verification algorithm, respectively. It is acceptable to solve the key escrow problem. Lowest row of Table 1 shows that the comprehensive scheme obtains both the benefits introduced by OO and EF model. Table 2 shows the transmission overhead of the schemes. Here, the transmission overhead includes a signature appended to an original message and a user parameter for key abusing detecting in the EF model. We can observe that both the EF and OO models introduce trivial overhead to the primitive scheme, especially when the k, i.e. the length of identity, is large.
Experimental Evaluation
The PBC library [8] , RELIC [9] and TEPLA [10] are the most fundamental toolkits in realising the pairing-based cryptography. By using the Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve, TEPLA is very efficient in implementing asymmetric pairing. However, the above four schemes are achieved by using symmetric pairing, which makes TEPLA not suitable in our situation. Meanwhile, RELIC is a very comprehensive cryptographic toolkit that can be applied on different platforms. However, in order to use symmetric pairing, the only one curve that we can choose has the group order of 1536 bits and the field size of 2048 bits, which results in rather low computation efficiency with high cost of time and storage.
On the same level of security with the group order of 1536 bits and the field size of 2048 bits, we make a comparsion between the realisation results of SHER-IBS scheme based on PBC and RELIC. Our implementations are written in C and compiled with GCC 4.8.4 in Ubuntu 14.04. We run the programs at a Desktop, which equips Intel(R) Core Duo CPU i5-3550 at 3.30 GHz and 8G memory. The results are shown in Fig. 1 .
Varying the length of user identities, Fig. 1 plots the computational cost of signing and verification of the SHER-IBS scheme. We can see that both signing and verification cost as long as seconds to implement the experiment. Thus, Fig. 2 Computational cost of online signing. Curve "OO" and curve "EFOO" are almost overlapped. Fig. 3 Computational cost of verification. Curve "EF" and curve "EFOO" are almost overlapped, and so as the curve "SHER" and curve "OO". big delay would be generated if it is used in real-time scenario, especially embedded systems, in which ECDSA signing/verification procedure is demanded to be finished within about 10 ms [11] . Figure 1 (a) shows that the efficiency of signing based on PBC is higher than based on RELIC, while the efficiency of verification based on RELIC is higher than based on PBC. This is because there is only group exponentiation and no paring computation in signing algorithm, while it is mainly pairing computation in verification algorithm. Thus, we can infer that the pairing computation based on RELIC is much more efficient than based on PBC.
We implement the four schemes based on PBC with enough security level, which have the group order of 160 bits and the field size of 1024 bits. Varying the user identity length, Fig. 2 plots the computational cost of online signing in the HIBS scheme. Note that, we take the signing procedures in SHER-IBS and CWS-EF-HIBS scheme as online signing since there are no offline signing procedures in the schemes. Figure 2 shows that the computational cost of online signing in both CWS-HIBOOS and CWS-EF-HIBOOS schemes is about 3 ms in terms of different identity length. On the other hand, the cost of signing is linearly increased in schemes without OO. And the lowest cost rises to 30 ms when the EF model is applied. Thus, we find that applying the OO model is effective in improving the real-time signing efficiency, especially when the EF model has been applied. Figure 3 shows the computational cost of verification of the HIBS schemes. From the figure, we can observe that the cost of verification also grows linearly as the length of identity in each scheme, and the OO model does not improve the verification efficiency. Comparing to online signing, the verification computational cost is still quite too high, and applying the EF model will even bring in about 20 ms to the cost. Therefore, we assume that the verification algorithms need to be further improved.
Conclusions
In this work, we reviewed four HIBS schemes, and implemented the schemes as well as evaluated their performance in terms of signing/verification computational cost and transmission overhead both theoretically and experimentally. Evaluation results showed that the escrow-free model proposed by Chen et al. was an effective solution to the key escrow problem. Moreover, the online/offline model was shown to improve the real-time signing efficiency.
